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WHAT ARE ABORIGINAL RIGHTS? 
Brian Slattery1 
This paper will appear in Foster, Raven & Webber, eds. Let 
Right Be Done: Calder, Aboriginal Title, and the Future of 
Indigenous Rights (Vancouver: University of British Columbia 
Press, forthcoming in 2007). The paper is still subject to editing, 
so if you would like to quote from it, please contact me first at 
slattery@yorku.ca. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 recognizes and 
affirms the “existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the 
aboriginal peoples of Canada”.2 The provision clearly builds on 
the Supreme Court’s recognition of aboriginal rights in the 
landmark Calder3 case, decided a decade earlier. However the 
sparse wording leaves open a number of fundamental questions. 
What precisely are aboriginal rights and where do they come 
from? Are they based on indigenous customary law, or the 
common law, or perhaps international law, or even natural law? 
Do all aboriginal peoples have the same set of aboriginal rights 
or does each group have its own specific set? 
1 Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto. The author is grateful 
to Professors Kent McNeil and Jeremy Webber for their helpful comments on 
an earlier draft of this paper. 
2 Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11. 
3 Calder v. Attorney General of British Columbia (1973), 34 D.L.R.(3d.) 145 
(S.C.C.). 
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These are difficult questions, which do not allow for simple or 
pat answers. Since 1982, many important pieces of the puzzle 
have been furnished by the Supreme Court of Canada in a series 
of significant decisions. However the pieces still lie scattered 
about in a somewhat disconnected fashion. This paper attempts 
to fit them together and fill in the gaps, so as to provide a 
coherent vision of aboriginal rights in Canada. The paper deals 
first with the important distinction between specific and generic 
rights, which emerges from the Court’s judgments in the Van 
der Peet 4 and Delgamuukw5 cases. It then discusses the main 
types of generic rights and their relationship to specific rights, 
arguing that generic rights provide the foundation for specific 
rights and supply the criteria that govern them. Generic rights 
are not only uniform in character, but also universal in 
distribution: they comprise a set of fundamental rights held by 
all aboriginal groups in Canada. 
II. SPECIFIC AND GENERIC RIGHTS6
In the Van der Peet case,7 the Supreme Court recognized a class 
of aboriginal rights whose nature and scope are determined by 
the particular circumstances of each specific aboriginal group. 
The Court held that in order to constitute an aboriginal right 
protected by s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, a present-day 
activity of an aboriginal group must be based on a practice, 
4 R. v. Van der Peet [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 (S.C.C.). 
5 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 (S.C.C.). 
6 This section draws on Brian Slattery, "Making Sense of Aboriginal and 
Treaty Rights" (2000) 79 Can. Bar Rev. 196 at 211-13. 
7 R. v. Van der Peet [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 (S.C.C.). See also the summary of the 
test in Mitchell v. M.N.R. [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911 (S.C.C.) at paras. 12-13. 
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custom or tradition that was integral to the distinctive culture 
of that specific group in the period prior to European contact.8 
To qualify as “integral” to a particular culture, a practice has to 
be a central and significant part of the culture, one of the things 
that makes the society what it is. So, aspects of an aboriginal 
society that are only incidental or occasional do not qualify; 
they must be defining and central features of the society.9 A 
practice has to be a characteristic element of the culture; 
however, it does not need to be unique or different from the 
practices of other societies. So, for example, fishing for food may 
constitute an aboriginal right, even though it is practised by 
many different societies around the world.10  
The rights recognized in Van der Peet are what we may call 
specific rights—rights whose existence, nature and scope are 
determined by factors that are particular to each aboriginal 
group. Specific rights differ from group to group and sometimes 
take quite specialized forms. For example, in the Gladstone 
8 R. v. Van der Peet [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 (S.C.C.) at paras. 46, 60. 
9 Ibid. at paras. 55-56. In R. v. Sappier; R. v. Gray, 2006 SCC 54 (S.C.C.), the 
Supreme Court stressed that this criterion should be applied flexibly 
“because the object is to provide cultural security and continuity for the 
particular aboriginal society” (para. 33). It does not mean that the pre-contact 
practice has to go to the “core of the society’s identity”, in the sense of 
constituting its single most important defining character (para. 40). Nor 
should the notion that the practice must be a “defining feature” of the 
aboriginal society be used “to create artificial barriers to the recognition and 
affirmation of aboriginal rights” (para. 41). The purpose is “to understand the 
way of life of the particular aboriginal society, pre-contact, and to determine 
how the claimed right relates to it” (para. 40). 
10 R. v. Van der Peet [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 (S.C.C.) at paras. 71-72. The point is 
reiterated and sharpened in R. v. Sappier; R. v. Gray, 2006 SCC 54 (S.C.C.) at 
paras. 42-46. 
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case11 the Supreme Court held that the members of the Heiltsuk 
people of British Columbia had an aboriginal right to trade in 
herring spawn on kelp (a kind of seaweed) and that this trade 
might be conducted on a commercial basis. The Court’s holding 
was based on historical and anthropological evidence showing 
that the Heiltsuk had engaged in such a trade as an integral part 
of their culture prior to contact with Europeans. The right was 
obviously one that few other aboriginal groups would be able to 
claim. It was rooted in the distinctive practices of the Heiltsuk 
Nation, and indeed was confined to trade in a single, rather 
exotic commodity.  
In Van der Peet, the Supreme Court expressed the view that all 
aboriginal rights were specific rights.12 However, this proved to 
be a premature generalization. It was quietly discarded by the 
Court in the Delgamuukw case,13 decided the following year. 
The hereditary chiefs of the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en peoples 
asserted aboriginal title to a large tract of land in northern 
British Columbia, a claim that was contested by the British 
                                            
11 R. v. Gladstone [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723 (S.C.C.). 
12 R. v. Van der Peet [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 (S.C.C.) at para. 69. 
13 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 (S.C.C.). For 
discussion, see Owen Lippert, ed. Beyond the Nass Valley: National 
Implications of the Supreme Court's Delgamuukw Decision (Vancouver: The 
Fraser Institute, 2000); Kent McNeil, Emerging Justice? Essays on Indigenous 
Rights in Canada and Australia (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan 
Native Law Centre, 2001) at 58-160. The concept of aboriginal title is 
analysed in Brian Slattery, "Understanding Aboriginal Rights" (1987) 66 Can. 
Bar Rev. 727; Kent McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1989); Patrick Macklem, "What's Law Got to Do With It? 
The Protection of Aboriginal Title in Canada" (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 
125; Kent McNeil, "Aboriginal Title and the Supreme Court: What's 
Happening?" (2006) 69 Sask. L. Rev. (forthcoming); Brian Slattery, “The 
Metamorphosis of Aboriginal Title” (2006) 85 Can. Bar Rev. (forthcoming). 
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Columbia government. In argument before the Court, the 
parties to the case advanced strikingly different conceptions of 
aboriginal title, which effectively raised the issue whether 
aboriginal title was a specific right, grounded in factors 
particular to each aboriginal group, or a right of a more 
generalized nature. 
The aboriginal claimants maintained that aboriginal title was 
equivalent to an inalienable fee simple, arguing that it was a 
right of a fixed and uniform character, similar in this respect to 
standard estates known to the English law of real property. 
According to this view, the nature of aboriginal title did not vary 
from group to group, depending on their particular culture or 
customs, but was the same in all cases. As such, aboriginal title 
did not constitute a specific right but was a right of a 
standardized character. 
In reply, the governments of British Columbia and Canada 
maintained that aboriginal title to land was simply a collection 
of particular aboriginal rights to engage in specific culture-based 
activities on the land. In other words, aboriginal title had no 
definite character; it was just a bundle of specific aboriginal 
rights, each of which had to be proven independently. At best, 
aboriginal title gave a group the right to the exclusive use and 
occupation of the land in order to exercise these specific rights. 
The group would not be entitled to use the land for any purposes 
it wanted; it would be limited to exercising the rights in its 
particular bundle. In effect, in order to engage in a certain 
activity on the land, a claimant group would have to prove that 
the particular activity in question satisfied the Van der Peet 
test—that it was an element of a practice, custom or tradition 
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that was integral to the group’s distinctive society at the time of 
European contact.14 
So, according to the governmental argument, the content of 
aboriginal title was variable. It differed from group to group, 
depending on the group’s particular cultural practices at the 
time of European contact. By contrast, according to the 
aboriginal parties, the content of aboriginal title was uniform 
and did not depend on the group’s historical practices. If a group 
had aboriginal title, it could use the land in any way it wanted, 
subject only to a restriction on transfers to third parties. 
In its judgment, the Supreme Court rejected the governmental 
argument and adopted a position close to that of the aboriginal 
parties. Chief Justice Lamer stated that aboriginal title is 
governed by two principles.15 Under the first principle, a group 
holding aboriginal title has the right to the exclusive use and 
occupation of the land for a broad range of purposes. These 
purposes do not need to be grounded in the group’s ancestral 
practices, customs and traditions. So, a group that originally 
lived mainly by hunting, fishing and gathering would be free to 
farm the land, raise cattle on it, exploit its natural resources or 
use it for residential, commercial or industrial purposes. 
Nevertheless, according to the second principle, land held under 
aboriginal title is subject to an “inherent limit”. This prevents 
the land from being used in a manner that is irreconcilable with 
the fundamental nature of the group’s attachment to the land, so 
as to ensure that the land is preserved for use by future 
generations. In other words, the group may not ruin the land or 
render it unusable for its original purposes. 
                                            
14 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 (S.C.C.) at paras. 
110-11. 
15 Ibid. at paras. 116-32. 
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The crucial point to note here is that the Supreme Court treats 
aboriginal title as a uniform right, whose basic dimensions do 
not vary from group to group according to their traditional ways 
of life. All groups holding aboriginal title have fundamentally 
the same kind of right, subject only to minor variations 
stemming from the inherent limit. In effect, the Supreme Court 
recognizes that aboriginal title is not a specific right of the kind 
envisaged in Van der Peet, or even a bundle of specific rights. 
Aboriginal title is what we may call a generic right—a right of a 
standardized character that is basically identical in all aboriginal 
groups where it occurs. The fundamental dimensions of the 
right are determined by the common law doctrine of aboriginal 
rights rather than by the unique circumstances of each group. 
In short, in Van der Peet and Delgamuukw the Supreme Court 
recognizes two different kinds of aboriginal rights—specific 
rights and generic rights. Specific rights are rights whose nature 
and scope are defined by factors pertaining to a particular 
aboriginal group. As such, they vary in character from group to 
group. Of course, different aboriginal groups may have similar 
specific rights, but this is just happenstance; it does not flow 
from the nature of the right. By contrast, generic rights are rights 
of a uniform character whose basic contours are established by 
the common law of aboriginal rights. All aboriginal groups 
holding a certain generic right have basically the same kind of 
right. The essential nature of the right does not vary according 
to factors peculiar to the group. 
The distinction between specific and generic rights gives rise to 
a number of important questions. First, is aboriginal title the 
sole instance of a generic right, or are there others? Second, 
what is the precise relationship between generic and specific 
rights; are they completely distinct or do they overlap in some 
fashion? Third, are generic rights not only uniform in character 
but also universal in distribution; that is, are they held by all 
aboriginal groups, or only by certain groups and not others? 
Fourth, are generic and specific rights both grounded in 
8 CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES [VOL. 03 NO. 02 
 
 
historical practice; if so, are they open to evolution and change? 
The remainder of this paper will be devoted to answering these 
questions. 
III. THE RANGE AND CHARACTER OF GENERIC 
RIGHTS 
Is aboriginal title the only example of a generic right? If we 
review the Van der Peet decision in the light of Delgamuukw, 
we come to a surprising conclusion. Recall that in Van der Peet 
the Court holds that aboriginal groups have the right to engage 
in activities based on the practices, customs and traditions that 
were integral to their distinctive cultures at the time of 
European contact. To be “integral” to a particular culture, a 
practice must be a central and significant part of the culture, one 
of the things that makes the society what it is.16 When we stand 
back from this decision, we can see that it has the effect of 
recognizing another generic right: it holds that aboriginal 
peoples have the generic right to maintain the central and 
significant features of their historical cultures. 
At the abstract level, this right has a fixed and uniform 
character. Each and every aboriginal group has the same general 
right—to maintain the principal aspects of their culture. Of 
course, what is “central and significant” varies from group to 
group, in accordance with their particular circumstances, so that 
at the concrete level the abstract right blossoms into a variety of 
distinctive specific rights—a matter we will come back to later. 
However, the point to grasp here is that the abstract right itself 
is uniform. As such, it constitutes a generic right—what we may 
call the right of cultural integrity. 
                                            
16 R. v. Van der Peet [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 (S.C.C.). 
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Are there still other generic aboriginal rights? A little reflection 
shows that the answer is yes. Here is a tentative list of generic 
rights, which includes the two rights already identified: 
• the right to conclude treaties 
• the right to customary law 
• the right to honourable treatment by the Crown 
• the right to an ancestral territory (aboriginal title) 
• the right of cultural integrity 
• the right of self-government 
This list is not necessarily complete, and some rights (such as 
the right of cultural integrity) may need to be sub-divided. 
However, it includes the most important generic rights tacitly 
recognized in Supreme Court cases so far. As the jurisprudence 
evolves, further generic rights may come to light. Here we will 
say a few words about each of the rights listed, enough to give a 
taste of the subject. 
A. THE RIGHT TO CONCLUDE TREATIES 
Aboriginal peoples have the right to conclude binding treaties 
with the Crown and to enforce the Crown’s treaty promises in 
the courts.17 At Canadian common law, the treaty-making 
capacity of aboriginal groups has a fixed and uniform character 
which does not vary from group to group. The capacity of the 
Blackfoot is no greater or less than that of the Micmac or the 
Innu. All have the same power to negotiate treaties with the 
Crown, which are protected under s. 35(1) of the Constitution 
Act, 1982. As such, the right to conclude treaties constitutes a 
generic aboriginal right. 
                                            
17 The capacity of Indian nations to conclude treaties with the Crown is 
comprehensively reviewed in R. v. Sioui [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025 (S.C.C.) at 1037-
43. 
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The right of aboriginal peoples to treat with the Crown is 
matched by the Crown’s right to treat with aboriginal peoples 
under the royal prerogative. In both cases, the power flows from 
the inter-societal law of aboriginal rights, which forms part of 
the common law of Canada.18 Since the time of Confederation, 
the Crown’s power in this area has vested primarily in the 
federal government under s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 
1867. 
The right to conclude treaties is one of the most important of 
the generic rights held by aboriginal peoples, with roots reaching 
back to the earliest days of European settlement on the 
continent. It is a highly distinctive right, without exact parallels 
in other spheres of Canadian constitutional law. Although 
provincial governments may of course conclude agreements 
with the federal government, these agreements have a quite 
different character and do not hold the constitutional status and 
protection enjoyed by aboriginal treaties.19 
                                            
18 For discussion of the inter-societal character of this law, see Brian Slattery, 
"Understanding Aboriginal Rights" (1987) 66 Can. Bar Rev. 727 at 736-41, 
744-45; Brian Slattery, "Making Sense of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights" (2000) 
79 Can. Bar Rev. 196 at 198-206; Brian Slattery, “The Metamorphosis of 
Aboriginal Title” (2006) 85 Can. Bar Rev. (forthcoming). For parallel 
approaches, see Mark D. Walters, "British Imperial Constitutional Law and 
Aboriginal Rights: A Comment on Delgamuukw v. British Columbia" (1992) 
17 Queen's L.J. 350; Jeremy Webber, "Relations of Force and Relations of 
Justice: The Emergence of Normative Community between Colonists and 
Aboriginal Peoples" (1995) 33 Osgoode Hall L.J. 623; John Borrows, "With or 
Without You: First Nations Law (in Canada)" (1996) 41 McGill L.J. 629; John 
Borrows & Leonard I. Rotman, "The Sui Generis Nature of Aboriginal Rights: 
Does It Make a Difference?" (1997) 36 Alta. L. Rev. 9; Mark D. Walters, "The 
"Golden Thread" of Continuity: Aboriginal Customs at Common Law and 
Under the Constitution Act, 1982" (1999) 44 McGill L.J. 711. 
19 On the constitutional effects of federal-provincial agreements, see 
Reference Re Canada Assistance Plan (B.C.) [1991] 2 S.C.R. 525, and 
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B. THE RIGHT TO CUSTOMARY LAW 
Aboriginal peoples have the right to maintain and develop their 
distinctive systems of customary law within an all-embracing 
federal framework that features multiple and overlapping legal 
systems and levels of government.20 The introduction of French 
and English laws into the colonies founded by the European 
powers did not have the effect of wiping out the customary laws 
of aboriginal groups, which continued to operate within their 
respective spheres. As Justice McLachlin observes in Van der 
Peet:21 
The history of the interface of Europeans and the 
common law with aboriginal peoples is a long one. As 
might be expected of such a long history, the 
principles by which the interface has been governed 
have not always been consistently applied. Yet 
running through this history, from its earliest 
beginnings to the present time is a golden thread—the 
recognition by the common law of the ancestral laws 
and customs [of] the aboriginal peoples who occupied 
the land prior to European settlement. 
                                                                                                            
discussion in Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 3rd ed. 
(Scarborough, Ont.: Carswell, 1992) at 12.3(a). 
20 See Connolly v. Woolrich (1867), 17 R.J.R.Q. 75 (Que. S.C.); Casimel v. 
Insurance Corp. of British Columbia [1994] 2 C.N.L.R. 22 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. 
Van der Peet [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 (S.C.C.) esp. at paras. 38-40; Delgamuukw v. 
British Columbia [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 (S.C.C.) at paras. 146-48; Campbell v. 
British Columbia (Attorney General) [2000] 4 C.N.L.R. 1 (B.C.S.C.) at paras. 
83-136; Mitchell v. M.N.R. [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911 (S.C.C.) at paras. 9-10, 61-64, 
141-54. 
21 R. v. Van der Peet [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 (S.C.C.) at para. 263. Justice 
McLachlin was dissenting, but not on this point. 
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The right of aboriginal peoples to maintain their own laws is a 
generic right, whose basic scope is determined by the common 
law doctrine of aboriginal rights. It does not differ from group to 
group or from area to area. The Mohawk and Haida peoples are 
equally entitled to enjoy their respective systems of customary 
law. Nevertheless, the legal systems protected by the generic 
right obviously differ in content. Mohawk laws are not the same 
as Haida laws.  
Aboriginal systems of customary law have a status similar to 
that of provincial legal systems. At Confederation, the 
Constitution Act, 1867 provided that the laws in force in the 
provinces would continue in force, subject to the legislative 
powers of the federal and provincial governments.22 Existing 
bodies of provincial law were carried forward into the new 
federation, and the power to amend or repeal those laws was 
distributed between the two main levels of government. 
C. THE RIGHT TO HONOURABLE TREATMENT BY THE 
CROWN 
Aboriginal peoples have the right to the fiduciary protection of 
the Crown and the right to the performance of particular 
fiduciary duties flowing from that relationship.23 In the Sparrow 
case,24 the Supreme Court stated: 
...the Government has the responsibility to act in a 
fiduciary capacity with respect to aboriginal peoples. 
                                            
22 Section 129, Constitution Act, 1867. 
23 See Guerin v. The Queen [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335 (S.C.C.); R. v. Sparrow [1990] 1 
S.C.R. 1075 (S.C.C.); R. v. Van der Peet [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 (S.C.C.) at paras. 
24-25; Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada [2002] S.C.R. (S.C.C.). 
24 R. v. Sparrow [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 (S.C.C.) at 1108. 
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The relationship between the Government and 
aboriginals is trust-like, rather than adversarial, and 
contemporary recognition and affirmation of 
aboriginal rights must be defined in light of this 
historic relationship.  
Although the Court was referring here to s. 35(1) of the 
Constitution Act, 1982, subsequent Supreme Court decisions 
have made it clear that the Crown’s fiduciary responsibility is 
not confined to this context but accompanies and controls the 
discretionary powers that the Crown historically has assumed 
over the lives of aboriginal peoples.25 As McLachlin C.J. notes in 
the Mitchell case,26 from early days the Crown asserted 
sovereignty over aboriginal lands and underlying title to the soil: 
from this assertion “arose an obligation to treat aboriginal 
peoples fairly and honourably, and to protect them from 
exploitation”. 
At the most abstract level, the right to honourable treatment by 
the Crown is a generic right, which vests uniformly in aboriginal 
peoples across Canada. The point is underlined in the Haida 
Nation case,27 where McLachlin C.J. holds that the honour of the 
Crown is always at stake in its dealings with aboriginal peoples. 
The Crown has the general duty to determine, recognize and 
respect the rights of aboriginal groups over which it has asserted 
sovereignty. This in turn binds the Crown to enter into treaty 
negotiations with aboriginal peoples for the purpose of 
reconciling their rights with the advent of Crown sovereignty 
and to achieve a just settlement. Pending the conclusion of 
                                            
25 Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada [2002] S.C.R. (S.C.C.) at paras. 79-80. 
26 Mitchell v. M.N.R. [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911 (S.C.C.) at para. 9. 
27 Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests) [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511 
(S.C.C.) at paras. 16-25. 
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treaties determining these rights, the Crown has a duty to 
consult with aboriginal peoples whenever it undertakes actions 
that may affect their asserted rights, and also to accommodate 
these rights where necessary. In situations where the Crown has 
assumed discretionary control over specific aboriginal interests, 
the honour of the Crown gives rise to a fiduciary duty. This 
generally requires the Crown to act with reference to the 
aboriginal group’s best interest in exercising its discretion over 
the specific aboriginal interest at stake. 
In effect, then, the generic right to honourable treatment gives 
rise to a range of more precise rights and duties that attach to 
specific subject-matters in particular contexts. As Binnie J. 
explains in the Wewaykum case,28 not all obligations existing 
between the parties to a fiduciary relationship are themselves 
fiduciary in nature, and this observation holds true of the 
relationship between the Crown and aboriginal peoples. It is 
necessary to focus on the particular obligation or interest that is 
the subject matter of the dispute and to inquire whether the 
Crown had assumed sufficient discretionary control in relation 
thereto to ground a fiduciary obligation. 
In the context of Indian reserves, for example, the nature and 
intensity of the Crown’s fiduciary duties differ depending on 
whether the subject-matter relates to the creation of a new 
reserve or the protection of an existing reserve.29 Where the 
Crown sets out to create a new reserve in lands where the Indian 
beneficiaries have no prior treaty or aboriginal claims, its 
fiduciary duties are limited to the basic obligations of loyalty, 
good faith in the discharge of its mandate, providing full 
appropriate disclosure, and acting in the best interest of the 
                                            
28 Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada [2002] S.C.R. (S.C.C.) at para. 83. 
29 Ibid. at paras. 86-104. 
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beneficiaries. However, once a reserve has been created, the 
Crown’s fiduciary duties expand to include the protection and 
preservation of the Indian band’s interest from exploitation. 
D. THE RIGHT TO AN ANCESTRAL TERRITORY (ABORIGINAL 
TITLE) 
Aboriginal peoples have the right to the exclusive possession 
and use of lands occupied at the time of sovereignty. Aboriginal 
title exists as a burden on the Crown’s underlying title and may 
not be transferred to third parties but only ceded to the Crown.30 
As seen earlier, aboriginal title has a uniform legal character, 
which does not vary from group to group according to their 
customs. At the same time, aboriginal title provides a 
framework for the internal operation of the distinctive land laws 
of each aboriginal group and so allows for quite varied regimes of 
property rights and interests.31 
Aboriginal title is similar in this respect to the title held by the 
provinces to lands within their boundaries under section 109 of 
the Constitution Act, 1867. In principle, the provincial title is a 
uniform one and gives provinces the same range of rights to 
their lands and resources, subject to any specific constitutional 
provisions. However, land laws obviously vary from province to 
province and generate distinctive regimes of property rights and 
interests. The property system of Quebec is very different from 
that of Manitoba. 
                                            
30 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 (S.C.C.). 
31 See Brian Slattery, “The Metamorphosis of Aboriginal Title” (2006) 85 Can. 
Bar Rev. (forthcoming) and references in footnote 13, above. 
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E. THE RIGHT OF CULTURAL INTEGRITY 
As seen earlier, in Van der Peet the Supreme Court recognizes 
that aboriginal peoples have the right to maintain the central 
and significant features of their historical cultures. The generic 
right of cultural integrity gives birth to a host of specific rights 
that differ from group to group in accordance with their 
distinctive practices, customs and traditions, such as the right to 
hunt, the right to fish, the right to harvest certain natural 
resources, the right to practice a certain religion, the right to 
speak a certain language, and so on. Despite such differences, 
these specific rights fall into a number of broad classes, which 
relate to such subjects as livelihood, religion, language, and art. 
These classes constitute generic cultural rights of intermediate 
generality. 
For example, the right to practice a traditional religion arguably 
qualifies as an intermediate cultural right because spirituality is 
normally a central and significant feature of aboriginal societies. 
Viewed in the abstract, this right has a uniform scope, which 
does not vary from one aboriginal people to another. However, 
the particular activities protected by the right differ from group 
to group, depending on the distinctive religious practices and 
beliefs of the group. In effect, then, the generic right of cultural 
integrity harbours an intermediate right to practice a traditional 
religion, which in turn shelters a plethora of specific religious 
rights vested in particular aboriginal groups. 
Consider another example. Aboriginal groups arguably have the 
constitutional right to use their ancestral languages and to 
engage in the activities needed to maintain and perpetuate these 
languages, such as teaching these languages at school. The 
language of a group is normally an integral feature of its 
ancestral culture and an important means by which the culture 
is manifested, nurtured and transmitted. So the right to speak an 
aboriginal language has a strong claim to qualify as a cultural 
right of intermediate generality. According to this approach, the 
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abstract dimensions of this right are identical in all aboriginal 
groups where the right occurs, however it gives rise to specific 
rights to speak and transmit particular aboriginal languages. 
Perhaps the most important intermediate right is what we may 
call the right of livelihood. A fundamental principle informing 
the Crown’s acquisition of sovereignty was that an aboriginal 
people could continue to gain its living in its accustomed 
manner. Justice McLachlin identified this right in her dissenting 
opinion in the Van der Peet case.32 Citing the terms of treaties 
and the Royal Proclamation of 1763,33 she observed: 
These arrangements bear testimony to the acceptance 
by the colonizers of the principle that the aboriginal 
peoples who occupied what is now Canada were 
regarded as possessing the aboriginal right to live off 
their lands and the resources found in their forests and 
streams to the extent they had traditionally done so. 
The fundamental understanding—the Grundnorm of 
settlement in Canada—was that the aboriginal people 
could only be deprived of the sustenance they 
traditionally drew from the land and adjacent waters 
by solemn treaty with the Crown, on terms that would 
ensure to them and to their successors a replacement 
for the livelihood that their lands, forests and streams 
had since ancestral times provided them.34 
                                            
32 R. v. Van der Peet [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 (S.C.C.) at paras. 270-72. 
33 Royal Proclamation of 7 October 1763. The most accurate printed text is 
found in Clarence S. Brigham, ed., British Royal Proclamations Relating to 
America (Worcester, Mass.: American Antiquarian Society, 1911), 212. 
34 R. v. Van der Peet [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 (S.C.C.) at para. 272. 
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This viewpoint later attracted the Supreme Court’s support in 
the Marshall case.35 In the course of interpreting a Mi’kmaq 
treaty concluded in 1760, Justice Binnie appealed to a 
fundamental precept of British imperial practice in North 
America, which held that when an aboriginal people passed 
under Crown sovereignty it was entitled to continue to sustain 
itself in the manner it had done previously. As Justice Binnie 
noted dryly, this principle was not wholly disinterested: 
Peace was bound up with the ability of the Mi’kmaq 
people to sustain themselves economically. Starvation 
breeds discontent. The British certainly did not want 
the Mi’kmaq to become an unnecessary drain on the 
public purse of the colony of Nova Scotia or of the 
Imperial purse in London, as the trial judge found. To 
avoid such a result, it became necessary to protect the 
traditional Mi’kmaq economy, including hunting, 
gathering and fishing.36 
The right of livelihood attracted detailed discussion in the 
recent Sappier case,37 where Justice Bastarache held that the 
weight of authority supports the view that section 35 protects 
the means by which an aboriginal society traditionally sustained 
itself. He went on to explain that the doctrine of aboriginal 
rights arises from the simple fact of prior occupation of the lands 
now forming Canada. So the Court’s focus should be on the 
nature of this prior occupation. This involves an inquiry into the 
traditional way of life of a particular aboriginal community, 
including their means of survival. 
                                            
35 R. v. Marshall [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456 (S.C.C.). 
36 Ibid. at para. 25. See also: Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of 
Canadian Heritage) [2005] 3 S.C.R. 388 (S.C.C.) at para. 26. 
37 R. v. Sappier; R. v. Gray 2006 SCC 54 (S.C.C.) esp. at paras. 37-40, 45. 
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In summary, the right of cultural integrity forms a pyramid with 
three levels. At the top is the abstract right itself, which takes 
the same general form in all aboriginal groups. Beneath this lies 
a tier of intermediate generic rights which relate to distinct 
subject-matters such as livelihood, religion, language and art. At 
the bottom rests a broad range of specific rights that differ from 
group to group in accordance with their particular cultural 
characteristics. 
F. THE RIGHT OF SELF-GOVERNMENT 
Aboriginal peoples have the right to govern themselves within a 
federal constitutional framework characterized by a division of 
powers among various orders of government.38 This right finds 
its source in the British Crown’s recognition that it could not 
secure the amity of the indigenous nations over which it 
claimed sovereignty without acknowledging their right to 
manage their own internal affairs. As Justice Lamer noted in the 
Sioui case,39 the Crown treated Indian nations with generosity 
and respect, out of the fear that the safety and development of 
British colonies would otherwise be compromised: 
The British Crown recognized that the Indians had 
certain ownership rights over their land, it sought to 
establish trade with them which would rise above the 
level of exploitation and give them a fair return. It also 
allowed them autonomy in their internal affairs, 
intervening in this area as little as possible. 
                                            
38 Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (Ottawa: 
Canada Communication Group, 1996); Campbell v. British Columbia 
(Attorney General) [2000] 4 C.N.L.R. 1 (B.C.S.C.); Brian Slattery, "First 
Nations and the Constitution: A Question of Trust" (1992) 71 Can. Bar Rev. 
261 at 278-87. 
39 R. v. Sioui [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025 (S.C.C.) at 1054-55, emphasis added. 
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It is submitted that the right of self-government is a generic 
right, which recognizes a uniform set of governmental powers 
held by aboriginal peoples as a distinct order of government 
within the Canadian federal system. At the same time, it allows 
aboriginal groups to establish and maintain their own 
constitutions, which take a variety of forms. There are close 
parallels here to the provinces, which possess a set of generic 
governmental powers under s. 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867, 
but also are entitled to maintain distinctive provincial 
constitutions. 
It could be argued that the aboriginal right of self-government is 
not a generic right but a collection of specific rights, each of 
which has to be proven separately under the Van der Peet test.40 
In the Pamajewon case,41 the Supreme Court viewed the 
question through the lens of Van der Peet and held that the right 
of self-government would have to be proven as an element of 
specific practices, customs and traditions integral to the 
particular aboriginal society in question. According to this 
approach, the right of self-government would be a collage of 
specific rights to govern particular activities rather than a 
generic right to deal with a range of abstract subject-matters. 
However, the Pamajewon case was decided prior to the Court’s 
decision in Delgamuukw, which expanded the horizons of 
aboriginal rights and recognized the category of generic rights. 
In the light of Delgamuukw, it seems more sensible to treat the 
right of self-government as a generic aboriginal right rather than 
a bundle of specific rights. On this view, the right of self-
government is governed by uniform principles laid down by 
                                            
40 The following discussion draws on Brian Slattery, "Making Sense of 
Aboriginal and Treaty Rights" (2000) 79 Can. Bar Rev. 196 at 213-14. 
41 R. v. Pamajewon [1996] 2 S.C.R. 821 (S.C.C.), at 832-33. 
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Canadian common law. The basic scope of the right does not 
vary from group to group; however its application to a particular 
group differs depending on the circumstances. This is the 
approach taken in the Report of the Royal Commission on 
Aboriginal Peoples, which the Supreme Court cites in its brief 
comments on self-government in the Delgamuukw case.42 
Nevertheless, certain other observations made in Delgamuukw 
might be considered adverse to this approach. In declining to be 
drawn into an analysis of self-government, the Court reiterates 
its holding in Pamajewon that rights to self-government cannot 
be framed in “excessively general terms” and notes that the 
aboriginal parties to the case had advanced the right to self-
government “in very broad terms, and therefore in a manner not 
cognizable under s. 35(1).”43 It is submitted that these remarks 
should be understood simply as a warning against over-
ambitious litigation, which attempts to induce the courts to 
settle very difficult questions in a vacuum, without an 
appropriate factual or doctrinal context.44 
                                            
42 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 (S.C.C.), at 1115; 
see Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (Ottawa: 
Canada Communication Group, 1996), Vol. 2, Part 1, esp. at 163-280. On the 
right of self-government, see Patrick Macklem, "First Nations Self-
Government and the Borders of the Canadian Legal Imagination" (1991) 36 
McGill L.J. 382; Brian Slattery, "First Nations and the Constitution: A 
Question of Trust" (1992) 71 Can. Bar Rev. 261 at 278-87; Patrick Macklem, 
"Distributing Sovereignty: Indian Nations and Equality of Peoples" (1993) 45 
Stanf. L. Rev. 1311. 
43 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 (S.C.C.), at 1114-15. 
44 As the Court states: “The broad nature of the claim [of self-government] at 
trial also led to a failure by the parties to address many of the difficult 
conceptual issues which surround the recognition of aboriginal self-
government. ... We received little in the way of submissions that would help 
us to grapple with these difficult and central issues. Without assistance from 
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IV. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GENERIC AND 
SPECIFIC RIGHTS 
The link between generic and specific rights should now be 
clear. Specific rights are concrete instances of generic rights. So, 
for example, the generic right to honourable treatment by the 
Crown operates at a high level of abstraction and harbours a 
range of intermediate generic rights relating to different subject-
matters, such as the creation of Indian reserves or the protection 
of existing reserves. These intermediate rights, in turn, engender 
myriad specific fiduciary rights vesting in particular aboriginal 
groups, whose precise scope is determined by the concrete 
circumstances in which they arise. Similarly, the broad right of 
cultural integrity fosters a range of intermediate generic rights, 
which relate to such matters as livelihood, language and 
religion. These intermediate rights give birth to specific rights, 
whose character is shaped by the practices, customs and 
traditions of particular aboriginal groups. 
The precise relationship between generic and specific rights 
varies depending on the generic right in question. Consider, for 
example, the generic right of self-government. As just seen, this 
arguably confers the same set of governmental powers on all 
aboriginal peoples in Canada. In this respect, the right of self-
government resembles the uniform package of governmental 
powers vested in the provinces. However, this abstract 
homogeneity does not mean that aboriginal peoples possess the 
same internal constitutions and governmental structures or that 
they exercise their governmental powers up to their full 
theoretical limits. An important component of the aboriginal 
right of self-government is the power of an aboriginal group to 
                                                                                                            
the parties, it would be imprudent for the Court to step into the breach.”; 
ibid., at 1115. 
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establish and amend its own constitution within the 
overarching framework of the Canadian Constitution. This 
power parallels the power of a province to amend its own 
constitution under section 45 of the Constitution Act, 1982. So, 
it appears that the generic right of self-government, in allowing 
for the creation of a variety of governmental structures, 
engenders a range of specific governmental powers and rights, as 
detailed in the particular constitutions of aboriginal groups. 
However, not all generic rights blossom into specific rights. For 
example, the generic right to conclude treaties empowers 
aboriginal groups to enter into binding agreements with the 
Crown. As such, the right gives rise to a wide array of treaties, 
which differ in subject-matter and scope. While it is true that 
each such treaty represents the concrete application of the 
abstract generic right, it seems an excess of legal logic to say 
that each treaty therefore represents a “specific aboriginal 
right”. Similarly, the generic right to an autonomous legal 
system harbours a host of distinct legal systems enjoyed by 
particular aboriginal groups. Although each such system is a 
concrete manifestation of the overarching generic right, it is 
arguably artificial to treat it as a specific right. 
While not all generic rights give birth to specific rights, all 
specific rights are the offspring of generic rights. In other words, 
there are no “orphan” specific rights. The reason is that generic 
rights provide the basic rules governing the recognition and 
scope of specific rights. So an aboriginal group cannot possess a 
specific right unless it is rooted in a generic right; by the same 
token, the scope of a specific right cannot exceed the basic 
dimensions of the generic right that engenders it. 
V. THE UNIVERSALITY OF GENERIC RIGHTS 
Generic rights are not only uniform in character, they are also 
universal in distribution. They make up a set of fundamental 
rights presumptively held by all aboriginal groups in Canada. 
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There is no need to prove in each case that a group has the right 
to conclude treaties with the Crown, to enjoy a customary legal 
system, to benefit from the honour of the Crown, to occupy its 
ancestral territory, to maintain the central attributes of its 
culture, or to govern itself under the Crown’s protection. It is 
presumed that every aboriginal group in Canada has these 
fundamental rights, in the absence of valid legislation or treaty 
stipulations to the contrary. This situation is hardly surprising, 
given the uniform application of the doctrine of aboriginal rights 
across the country as a matter of Canadian common law. This 
doctrine applies to all the territories currently forming part of 
Canada, regardless of the precise manner in which the Crown 
acquired them or their original status as French or English 
colonies.45 
The generic rights held by aboriginal peoples resembles the set 
of constitutional rights vested in the provinces under the general 
provisions of the Constitution Act, 1867. Just as every province 
presumptively enjoys the same array of governmental powers, 
regardless of its size, population, wealth, resources or historical 
circumstances, so also every aboriginal group, large or small, 
presumptively enjoys the same range of generic aboriginal 
rights. 
However this conclusion could be disputed. For example, it 
could be argued that the generic right of aboriginal title is not a 
universal right. According to this viewpoint, certain aboriginal 
peoples did not have sufficiently stable connections with a 
definite territory to hold aboriginal title, although they may 
possess specific rights of hunting, fishing and gathering. Certain 
musings of the Supreme Court seem to entertain this 
                                            
45 See R. v. Côté [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139 (S.C.C.) at paras. 42-54; R. v. Adams 
[1996] 3 S.C.R. 101 (S.C.C.) at paras. 31-33; Brian Slattery, "Understanding 
Aboriginal Rights" (1987) 66 Can. Bar Rev. 727 at 736-41. 
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possibility.46 However, the better view is that every aboriginal 
group presumptively holds aboriginal title to an ancestral 
territory, and that very strong evidence would be needed to 
overturn this presumption. 
VI. THE INCEPTION OF ABORIGINAL RIGHTS 
As a matter of Canadian law, aboriginal rights came into 
existence when the Crown gained sovereignty over an aboriginal 
people—what we will call the “time of sovereignty”. Before that 
time, the relations between an aboriginal people and the Crown 
were governed by international law and the terms of any 
treaties. Although aboriginal peoples clearly held rights in 
international law prior to the time of sovereignty (and continue 
to hold certain international rights today), it was only when the 
Crown gained sovereignty that aboriginal rights as such arose in 
Canadian law.47 So, it seems natural to think that the relevant 
historical date for establishing the existence of aboriginal rights 
is the time of sovereignty. However, the matter is not so 
straightforward. We have to distinguish between generic and 
specific rights. 
                                            
46 See R. v. Adams [1996] 3 S.C.R. 101 (S.C.C.) at paras. 27-28; R. v. 
Marshall/R. v. Bernard [2005] 2 S.C.R. 220 (S.C.C.) at paras. 58-59, 66. For 
discussion, see B. J. Burke, "Left Out in the Cold: The Problem with 
Aboriginal Title Under Section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 for 
Historically Nomadic Aboriginal Peoples" (2000) 38 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1; Brian 
Slattery, “The Metamorphosis of Aboriginal Title” (2006) 85 Can. Bar Rev. 
(forthcoming). 
47 For discussion of indigenous rights in international law, see S. James Anaya, 
Indigenous Peoples in International Law (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1996). 
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A. GENERIC RIGHTS 
As seen earlier, when an aboriginal people passes under the 
Crown’s sovereignty, it automatically gains a set of generic 
rights—the right of cultural integrity, the right to honourable 
treatment by the Crown, and so on. These rights come into 
existence at the time of sovereignty and possess a uniform 
character. Nevertheless, some generic rights have concrete 
aspects that change over time. For example, although the 
generic right to customary law arises at the time of sovereignty, 
the particular bodies of customary law protected by the right are 
not static but continue to evolve and adapt to keep pace with 
societal changes. It follows that the relevant date for 
determining the existence of a particular rule of customary law 
is not the date of sovereignty but the date of the activity or 
transaction whose legality is in question. So, for example, the 
validity of a purported customary adoption that occurred in 1960 
has to be determined by the customary rules prevailing at that 
date. Of course, the applicable rules must have existed for an 
appreciable period of time for them to gain the status of 
customary law. However, there is no need to show they existed 
at the time of sovereignty. 
Aboriginal title provides a different example. As seen earlier, 
when an aboriginal people passes under Crown sovereignty, it 
automatically gains title to its ancestral territories in Canadian 
law. So, prima facie, the boundaries of an aboriginal territory are 
ascertained by reference to the situation at the time of 
sovereignty.48 However, this general rule is subject to two 
qualifications, which we can discuss only briefly. The first 
relates to the Royal Proclamation of 1763, and the second to 
historical migrations. 
                                            
48 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 (S.C.C.) at paras. 
143-45. 
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The Royal Proclamation of 1763 recognizes the rights of all 
aboriginal peoples living under the Crown’s protection to the 
lands in their possession.49 It accepts the pattern of indigenous 
occupation existing in 1763 as the basis for aboriginal land 
rights, regardless of patterns of occupation that prevailed in 
earlier eras. So the Proclamation seems to provide a common 
historical baseline for all aboriginal groups living under British 
protection in 1763. However, there is good reason to think that, 
as of that date, the British Crown claimed sovereignty over the 
entirety of the territories now making up Canada.50 So, the year 
1763 arguably constitutes a uniform baseline for the entire 
country, from Newfoundland in the east to British Columbia in 
the west. 
The second qualification relates to historical migrations. In the 
fluid conditions that prevailed in early periods of Canadian 
history, it was common for aboriginal groups to migrate to new 
areas due to warfare, environmental change, depletion of 
resources, internal conflict, economic opportunities, and similar 
factors. The onset of Crown sovereignty did not bring this 
                                            
49 The Proclamation’s text is found in Clarence S. Brigham, ed., British Royal 
Proclamations Relating to America (Worcester, Mass.: American Antiquarian 
Society, 1911), 212. For detailed discussion, see Brian Slattery, The Land 
Rights of Indigenous Canadian Peoples, As Affected by the Crown's 
Acquisition of Their Territories (D.Phil. thesis, Oxford University, 1979; 
reprint, Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1979) at 
204-82; Brian Slattery, "The Hidden Constitution: Aboriginal Rights in 
Canada" (1984) 32 Am. J. Comp. L. 361 at 368-72; Brian Slattery, "The Legal 
Basis of Aboriginal Title", in Aboriginal Title in British Columbia: 
Delgamuukw v. The Queen, ed. F. Cassidy (Lantzville, B.C.: Oolichan Books, 
1992) at 121-29. 
50 See Brian Slattery, The Land Rights of Indigenous Canadian Peoples, As 
Affected by the Crown's Acquisition of Their Territories (D.Phil. thesis, 
Oxford University, 1979; reprint, Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan 
Native Law Centre, 1979) at 175-90. 
28 CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES [VOL. 03 NO. 02 
 
 
process to a sudden halt. Aboriginal groups continued to migrate 
in response to changes in their circumstances. With the 
establishment of effective British government and the creation 
of reserves, aboriginal mobility was gradually reduced, although 
in some areas it persisted into relatively recent times. When an 
aboriginal group migrated to a new area after the date of Crown 
sovereignty (or after the year 1763, whichever is later), it seems 
arguable that within a certain period—perhaps twenty to fifty 
years—it would gain aboriginal title to the new territory that it 
occupied while losing title to the territory it left behind.51 
B. SPECIFIC RIGHTS 
As we have seen, specific aboriginal rights arise under the 
auspices of their generic counterparts. While generic rights come 
into existence at the time of sovereignty, specific rights do not 
necessarily originate at that date. For example, the broad 
principle of the honour of the Crown takes force at the time of 
sovereignty, however specific fiduciary rights normally stem 
from events occurring well after that time, as when aboriginal 
lands are ceded to the Crown or a reserve is created. In such 
cases the relevant date for proving a specific fiduciary right is 
obviously the date of the event that triggered it, not the date of 
sovereignty. 
A more difficult issue is posed by the right of cultural integrity. 
Like other generic rights, the abstract right comes into existence 
at the time of sovereignty, and the same holds true of the 
intermediate generic rights that shelter under its auspices. What, 
then, of the specific cultural rights that occupy the bottom tier 
in the pyramid? In principle these specific rights cannot date 
                                            
51 See Delgamuukw v. British Columbia [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 (S.C.C.) per La 
Forest J. at paras. 197-98; Brian Slattery, "Understanding Aboriginal Rights" 
(1987) 66 Can. Bar Rev. 727 at 741-44, 755-69. 
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from a period earlier than the time of sovereignty, because as a 
matter of Canadian law (as distinct from indigenous law or 
international law) they do not exist prior to that date. So, 
presumably they must arise either at the time of sovereignty or 
at some later period, depending on the precise nature of the right 
in question. 
However, here we must draw a distinction between the date 
that a specific cultural right comes into existence and the date 
by reference to which its concrete content is determined—for 
the two are not necessarily the same. Supposing that a specific 
cultural right originates at the time of sovereignty, at what date 
is its concrete content fixed? This question is bedevilled by a 
puzzling problem. It stems from the fact that aboriginal cultures 
(like all cultures) are not static but undergo significant changes 
over time. After Europeans arrived in North America, aboriginal 
societies responded in a dynamic fashion to new opportunities, 
circumstances and influences.52 Just as European cultures 
quickly adopted many products of American origin, such as 
tomatoes, corn and potatoes (to say nothing of tobacco), so also 
native American cultures swiftly absorbed many items of 
European origin, such as horses, metal artefacts and firearms. 
Trade in furs, skins and fish transformed the economies of 
aboriginal societies and helped sustain the economies of the 
settler colonies. Christianity also had a notable impact on many 
aboriginal societies, as did aboriginal conceptions of personal 
freedom and federalism on European political thought. While 
venereal syphilis (often thought to be of American origin) took 
its toll in European societies, European diseases such as 
smallpox decimated many aboriginal societies and caused 
important changes in lifestyle, political organization and 
                                            
52 For a good survey, see Colin G. Calloway, New Worlds for All: Indians, 
Europeans, and the Remaking of Early America (Baltimore, Md.: John 
Hopkins University Press, 1997). 
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outlook.53 So the question arises, given the dynamic nature of 
aboriginal cultures and the fact that they underwent significant 
changes both before and after sovereignty, by reference to what 
time period should the concrete content of specific cultural 
rights be fixed? 
It is submitted that the most workable answer to this question 
is as follows. The doctrine of aboriginal rights and the honour of 
the Crown assured an aboriginal society that it had the right to 
retain and develop the central features of its culture as these 
existed at the time of effective Crown control. This approach 
universalizes the benchmark date laid down for Metis peoples in 
the Powley case,54 where the Court held that section 35 protects 
the customs and traditions that were historically important 
features of Métis communities “prior to the time of effective 
European control”. While the ruling is explicitly limited to 
Metis groups, we submit that it should apply to aboriginal 
groups across the board. It is hard to see why Indian and Inuit 
peoples, who often had close social and economic links with 
Metis groups, should have their aboriginal rights determined at a 
different date. Such a discrepancy leads only to bizarre and 
unjust results, whereby the Metis partners in a trading 
relationship would gain aboriginal rights denied to their Indian 
partners, simply due to a difference in benchmark dates.  
Of course, aboriginal cultures could (and did) change 
dramatically after the time of effective Crown control. In 
principle, an aboriginal society was free to take its cultural and 
                                            
53 See Bruce G. Trigger & William R. Swagerty, "Entertaining Strangers: North 
America in the Sixteenth Century", in The Cambridge History of the Native 
Peoples of the Americas, Vol. 1: North America, Part 1, ed. B. G. Trigger and 
W. E. Washburn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) at 363. 
Syphilis was probably carried back to Europe as early as 1493. 
54 R. v. Powley [2003] 2 S.C.R. 207 (S.C.C.) at para. 18. 
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economic life in any direction it found congenial. However, the 
Crown’s honour was only pledged to protect the central aspects 
of an aboriginal society as they existed at the time of effective 
control and later evolved to adapt to modern conditions.55 
Beyond that point, the members of aboriginal societies enjoyed 
the same legal rights and liabilities at common law as other 
members of the larger society.56 
The rationale for this approach is not hard to understand. When 
aboriginal peoples were confronted with encroaching Crown 
control, they were apprehensive that their lives would undergo 
swift and forced change in unwelcome and harmful ways. They 
required assurance that they could continue in their current 
modes of life and adapt their societies at the pace and in the 
ways they considered desirable. The honour of the Crown was 
committed to providing this assurance, both as a matter of basic 
justice and also because it was necessary to maintain the 
friendship of aboriginal peoples, which was crucial to the peace 
and security of the colonies. So, in light of this rationale, it is 
submitted that the benchmark date for specific cultural rights is 
the period at which the Crown gained effective control over a 
particular aboriginal group. 
However, in Van der Peet,57 the Supreme Court took a different 
approach. It held that the date for fixing the content of specific 
cultural rights is the time of European contact rather than 
effective control. The Court apparently considered that the right 
of cultural integrity was designed to preserve the central aspects 
                                            
55 On the evolution of aboriginal rights, see esp. R. v. Sparrow [1990] 1 S.C.R. 
1075 (S.C.C.) at p. 1093; R. v. Sappier; R. v. Gray 2006 SCC 54 (S.C.C.) at 
paras. 48-49. 
56 However, the Indian Acts notoriously did not respect this basic principle. 
57 R. v. Van der Peet [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 (S.C.C.). 
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of an aboriginal culture as these existed in their “original” form, 
prior to changes arising from European influence. The Court 
seems to have thought that there existed ideal types of 
aboriginal societies, untouched by outside influences, in the 
misty period prior to European contact. However, this approach 
loses sight of the underlying rationale for the right of cultural 
integrity, which is rooted in the honour of the Crown. It also 
makes little historical sense. For example, when the Indian 
nations of New France fell under effective British rule after 
1763, it would have strange for the Crown to seek to win their 
amity by guaranteeing the basic features of their cultures as 
these existed as much as two hundred years previous, when 
French adventurers first sailed up the St. Lawrence River. An 
approach less apt to win the friendship of the Indian nations and 
ensure the future security of Quebec can hardly be imagined. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
We have seen that aboriginal rights fall into two basic classes: 
generic rights and specific rights. Generic rights comprise a 
range of basic rights presumptively held by all aboriginal groups 
under Canadian common law. They include the right to 
conclude treaties, the right to customary law, the right to 
honourable treatment by the Crown, the right to an ancestral 
territory, the right of cultural integrity, and the right of self-
government. These abstract rights have a uniform character, 
which does not change from group to group. Specific rights, by 
contrast, arise under the auspices of generic rights and assume 
different forms in different aboriginal groups, depending on the 
particular circumstances of each group. Ranged between basic 
generic rights and specific rights are rights of intermediate 
generality, which relate to particular subject-matters. We 
suggest that this scheme provides a simple and practical way of 
understanding the otherwise bewildering array of aboriginal 
rights recognized in section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. 
